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(Under the direction of Jonas J. Monast) 
 
Energy generation is inextricably linked to climate change but there is debate concerning 
the most effective policies for “greening” our system. Federal-level polices are ideally situated to 
take advantage of economies of scale while rising above jurisdictional constraints. Yet state-level 
policies often are more politically feasible and allow for greater flexibility. Thus far, states have 
pursued renewable energy policies that can be broadly categorized as either technology-driven 
policies or technology-agnostic polices. Technology-driven policies are well-situated to target 
market barriers and historical subsidizations but are hindered by limited flexibility and cost 
constraints. Conversely, technology-agnostic policies are often more immediately actionable but 
contain hidden externalities. While the best solution is likely a matter of circumstance and 
opinion, it is critical that policymakers contemplate the implications behind these policy choices. 
These implications could determine whether electrification is a key part of the solution to global 
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 Our energy generation system is experiencing rapid change. The U.S. has evolved from a 
nation worried about fuel shortages and reliant on coal to one with a diversified energy mix that 
is currently on track to be a net energy exporter for the first in over sixty years.1 Hydraulic 
fracturing has unlocked new fuel sources, just as public support has begun to push states in the 
direction of increasingly ambitious renewable energy goals. These technological changes are 
occurring in the face of global climate change, which threatens severe impacts to our societal and 
economic wellbeing stemming from rising sea levels, increasing storm severity, desertification, 
and global biodiversity loss among others. In order to mitigate the effects of global climate 
change it is essential that we work towards efficient and effective emissions reductions.  
Electricity generation represents an important opportunity for emissions reductions. 
Greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation currently comprise the second single 
largest source of emissions in the U.S. 2 and are expected to grow rapidly due to widespread 
electrification and associated increased in electricity demand. If these trends continue emissions 
from electricity generation could comprise the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
U.S. in the near future. Therefore, efficiently and effectively reducing emissions from electricity 
generation is of paramount importance in addressing global climate change. Yet our current 
energy policies are ill-suited for the challenges of today and face mounting tensions. We need to 
develop goal-oriented energy policies to address the complex regulatory environment of today 
                                               
1 Id. at 13. 
2 Id.  
 2 
under threats of climate change while staying committed to the traditional metrics of 
affordability, reliability, and cleanliness by which we gauge acceptability of generation methods. 
Despite strong indications of the need for new energy policy, leaders and regulators are divided 
over the best path forward.  
Historically, states have taken the lead in regulating and encouraging energy generation 
within their borders. Yet a recent string of U.S. Supreme Court cases3 have hinted at an 
expanding role for federal regulators both creating uncertainty and leading to a robust debate 
over the relative value and effectiveness of state versus federal energy regulation. This regulatory 
uncertainty is compounded by disagreements over the “best” type of energy policy. As energy 
technology has advanced and new technologies have grown both in scale and importance it has a 
created a divide between advocates of technology-driven policies and advocates of technology-
agnostic policies. These two decision points, federal versus state and technology-driven versus 
technology-agnostic, will lay the foundation for energy generation policies for decades to come.   
 
Affordable, Reliable, and Clean 
 
 In envisioning and drafting new energy legislation for the modern day we should be 
cognizant of the characteristics we want our energy generation to embody.  Energy generation is 
unique among emission sources due to its essential role in modern life. We must therefore 
account for more than just emissions reductions when assessing new energy policies. Affordable, 
reliable, and clean have become the hallmarks of the electricity system we purport to be striving 
for. Although often weighted differently depending on the times, these metrics have guided 
                                               
3 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n (EPSA), 136 
S. Ct. 760 (2016); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). 
 3 
much our energy development thus far. First, energy should be affordable due to its essential 
nature. A lack of electricity is often an absolute barrier to full participation in society. The “just 
and reasonable” mandate was first proffered to protect electricity consumers from monopolistic 
pricing and persists to this day in light of the importance of electricity. Second, energy must be 
reliable. The Northeast Blackout of 2003 showcased what happens when energy isn’t reliable.4  
Fifty million people were affected and New York City alone lost over $500 million in only a few 
hours.5 Energy generation policies must maintain a commitment to reliability. Third, clean is 
both the most recent addition and the most heavily debated. Although energy legislation has paid 
lip service to renewable technology for some time, it has often primarily sought to increase 
domestic energy production regardless of cleanliness, often offering similar incentives for both 
renewable and non-renewable technology.6 Clean energy, however, has begun to grow in 
importance as its implications for global climate change become more well-known and better 
understood. Today, energy producers and distributers have coalesced around the importance of 
these three metrics7 although the path to achieving them is both less clear and subject to more 
debate.  In order to understand how best to move forward it is essential to understand the history 
of energy regulation in the U.S..  
 
                                               
4 This day in history, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/blackout-hits-northeast-united-states 
(last visited March 18, 2020).  
5 Id.  
6 See FRED SISSINE, RES., SCIENCE, AND INDU. DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV, RENEWABLE ENERGY PORTFOLIO 
STANDARD (RPS): BACKGROUND AND DEBATE OVER A NATIONAL REQUIREMENT (2007).  
7 See Erin Culbert, Duke Energy sets sights on net-zero carbon by 2050, ILLUMINATION (Sept. 17, 2019) 
https://illumination.duke-energy.com/articles/duke-energy-sets-sights-on-net-zero-carbon-by-
2050?_ga=2.205906320.260083576.1569102256-2088968392.1474936758 (discussing efforts to eliminate carbon 
emissions by 2050 while ensuring “diverse energy sources and a modern grid to protect reliability and 
affordability”); see also California ISO, http://www.caiso.com/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited March 18, 
2020) (“The California ISO maintains reliability on one of the largest and most modern power grids in the world . . . 
to meet the electricity needs of consumers, while increasing the amount of renewable energy to usher in the clean, 
green grid of the future.”).  
 4 
Regulatory Background  
 
 In order to understand how our energy metrics apply to our current system of generation 
and regulation it is important to understand the history of electricity regulation in the United 
States. The early conceptualization of electricity as a natural monopoly8 encouraged strict 
regulation, which still forms the basis of our regulatory system today.  Early regulation was 
needed to keep monopolies in check. For example, in the mid-1990s a significant majority of 
customers in the United States got their electricity from a single monopoly utility, typically 
called an investor-owned utility (IOU), which provided “generation, transmission, local 
distribution and billing/collections.”9  Without regulation these IOUs would have had 
unacceptable amounts of power over their customers. Despite subsequent efforts focused on 
introducing competition and “unbundling” monopoly systems, many of the regulatory mandates 
that were established early on are still in effect, at least in certain areas of the country, today.  
 Comprehensive federal and state regulation began in 1935 with the passage of the Federal 
Utility Act.10  The Federal Utility Act consisted of two major components: the Federal Power 
Act (FPA) and the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA).11  PUHCA gave 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) authority over many holding company 
transactions thereby limiting industry power over mergers and acquisitions and increasing 
                                               
8 “Electricity service has been considered a natural monopoly, meaning that the industry has (1) an inherent 
tendency toward declining long-term costs; (2) high threshold investment and (3) technological conditions that limit 
the number of potential entrants.” AMY ABEL, RES., SCIENCE, AND INDU. DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV, ELECTRICITY 
RESTRUCTURING BACKGROUND: THE PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY POLICIES ACT OF 1978 AND THE ENERGY 
POLICY ACT OF 1992 (1998). 
9 Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The US Electricity Industry after 20 years of Restructuring, 7 ANNU. REV. 
ECON. 437, 438 (2015). 
10ABEL, supra note 11.  
11 Id.   
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oversight.12  While PUHCA was primarily financial in nature, the FPA continues to serve as the 
primary vehicle by which Congress levies its influence over the electricity industry.13  The FPA 
charged the Federal Power Commission with the regulation of interstate transmission and sales 
of electricity and natural gas.14  Additionally, the FPA first codified the “just and reasonable 
standard” stating that electric public utility rates subject to FPC authority cannot be “unjust or 
unreasonable” or “unduly discriminatory or preferential.”15 While the FPA represented important 
first steps in limiting the economic power of electric utilities, it did little to introduce competition 
into the electric system or prepare it for new challenges.  
 The Pubic Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) was enacted in 1978 with the goal of 
increasing competition in the electricity sector in order to allow the energy sector to meet the 
new challenges of the 1970s.16  The 1970s were characterized by “dramatic and severe shortages 
of oil and natural gas and skyrocketing prices of almost every form of energy.”17  Skyrocketing 
prices and shortage-fueled fears brought energy efficiency and conservation to the forefront of 
the nation’s mind for the first time, affording it a unique opportunity to focus on energy policy. 
PURPA was the result of this focus. PURPA was passed with three primary goals: “conservation 
of energy supplies by electric utilizes”; “the optimization of the efficiency of use of facilities and 
resources by electric utilities”; and “equitable rates to electric consumers.”18  Although broadly 
focused on breaking down barriers to entry, PURPA was, at its heart, simply a series of 
mandates. Arguably the most important one of the mandates required utilities to purchase all of 
                                               
12 CONG. RESEARCH SERV, THE FEDERAL POWER ACT (FPA) AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2017) [hereinafter FPA 
AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS].  
13 Id.  
14 Id. 
15 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2020).  
16 FPA AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS, supra note 15.  
17 Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1283, 1306 (2013).  
18 Id.  
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the power produced by qualifying facilities (QFs)19 at “avoided cost”.20  This provision increased 
access to the market and opened the doors for increased reliance on market forces in the 
electricity industry.  Following the advent of PURPA both cogeneration and renewable facilities 
increased in number.21  Less than twenty years after the passage of PURPA, PURPA sources 
accounted for more than 5% of the United States’ generating capacity, with cogeneration 
facilities making significant strides.22  When viewed in the context of its statutory goals, PURPA 
was likely successful despite the original backlash it faced23 and relatively continuous calls for 
its repeal.24  When viewed more broadly PURPA could be seen as an early incremental change to 
electricity regulation which would launch a movement towards a market-oriented approach.25   
 The Energy Policy Act of 1992, signed into law by President George Bush on October 
24, 1992,26 furthered the goals of PURPA by expanding federal authority in regard to 
transmission access and increasing competition in the electricity sector.  Broadly speaking the 
Act gave support to integrated resource planning, mandated open access transmission for 
wholesale electricity and created a new category of generators.27  These new generators, called 
“exempt wholesale generators,” could “generate and sell electricity at wholesale without being 
                                               
19 Small power production facilities were defined as a facility which: “produces electric energy solely by the use, as 
a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, renewable resources, or any combination thereof” and “has a power 
production capacity which, together with any other facilities located at the same site (as determined by the 
Commission), is not greater than 80 megawatts.” 16 U.S.C § 796 (2006).  
20 Amy Abel & Larry Parker, , RES., SCIENCE, AND INDUS. DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. ISSUE BRIEF, ELECTRICITY: 
THE ROAD TOWARD RESTRUCTURING (2003) [hereinafter Abel & Parker].  
21 See Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L. J. 419, 
421 (1995). 
22 Id.  
23 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., EMD-81-105, Burdensome and Unnecessary Reporting Requirements of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act Need to be Changed (1981).   
24 See Cudahy, supra note 24; see also Peter Maloney, Is PURPA done? New bill takes aim at law’s mandatory 
purchase obligations, UTILITY DIVE, Feb. 12, 2018, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/is-purpa-done-new-bill-takes-
aim-at-laws-mandatory-purchase-obligation/516721/. 
25 Abel & Parker, supra note 23.  
26 THE NAT’L REG. RESEARCH INST., A SYNOPSIS OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992: NEW TASKS FOR STATE 
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS (1993) [hereinafter NRRI REPORT].  
27 Id.  
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regulated as utilities under PUHCA.”28  Furthermore, the Act provided these new generators with 
guaranteed transmission access, thereby significantly changing the playing field.  Although 
primarily focused on reducing competition, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 also emphasized the 
importance of renewable energy technologies, providing both R&D support as well as a number 
of incentives, including tax credits.29  While the stated goal of these incentives was to 
incorporate environmental externalities, the Act also provided similar incentives to both coal and 
nuclear technologies.30  Subsequently, peak oil imports31 and increasing environmentalism in the 
early 2000s lead to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which was the first holistic energy legislation 
to pass in more than a decade.32 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 had significant implications for PURPA. It repealed 
Section 210 of PURPA, commonly known as the mandatory purchase requirement, for new 
contracts as long as “FERC finds that a competitive electricity market exists and a qualifying 
facility has adequate access to wholesale markets.”33 This significantly lessened the importance 
of PURPA by essentially allowing utilities to opt out of “avoided cost” and opt into competitive 
markets instead.  Following 2005, significant parts of the country that had instituted regional 
transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs)34 found themselves 
                                               
28 Abel & Parker, supra note 23. 
29 NRRI REPORT, supra note 29. 
30 Id.  
31 Mike Patton, U.S. Dependence of Foreign Oil Hits 30-Year Low, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2016) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2016/04/20/u-s-dependence-on-foreign-oil-hits-30-year-
low/#1129564dff33.  
32 RES., SCIENCE, AND INDUS. DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005: SUMMARY AND 
ANALYSIS OF ENACTED PROVISIONS (2006).  
33 Id.  
34 “RTOs first developed in the 1990's to accommodate the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) policy 
to encourage competitive generation through requiring open access to transmission. In the Northeast, the RTOs 
evolved from power pools that had coordinated utility operations for many decades. Elsewhere (the Midwest, 
California and Texas), RTOs grew up to meet both State and federal policies on competitive generation and open 
transmission access.” Today in Energy, US ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=790. (last visited March 19, 2020) [hereinafter EIA Today in 
Energy]. 
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exempt from the mandatory purchasing requirement.35 Currently there are seven RTOs operating 
in the US, which supply approximately 60% of the power supply.36  This means that PURPA, 
still widely considered our guiding energy policy, significantly effects less than half of the of the 
country’s power supply.   
 
Current Electricity System  
 
 In 2018, approximately 4.18 trillion kilowatt hours of electricity was generated at utility 
generation facilities across the United States.37  Approximately, 17% of this energy came from 
renewable sources, 20% came from nuclear energy, and the remainder came from nonrenewable 
sources such as coal, natural gas, petroleum, and other gases.38 The AEO2019 Reference case39 
suggests many of these trends will continue. In particular, the reference case shows that of the 
fossil fuels natural gas and NGPLs will have the highest production growth, spurred on by low 
natural gas prices.40  According to the reference case, for the first time since 1953 the United 
States will also become a net energy exporter by 202041 actually realizing the rhetoric of an 
energy dominant nation for the first time. The EIA report further shows that the use of non-
hydroelectric renewables is growing the most quickly (in terms of percentage) supplemented by 
                                               
35 Maloney, supra note 27.  
36 The seven RTOs are California ISO; ISO-New England; Midcontinent ISO; New York ISO, PJM Interconnection, 
Southwest Power Pool, and Reliability Council of Texas (not subject to FERC jurisdiction). EIA Today in Energy, 
supra note 37. 
37 Frequently Asked Questions, US ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3. 
(last visited March 19, 2020).   
38 Id.  
39 A reference case “represents EIS’s best assessment of how U.S. and world energy markets will operate through 
2050” and should be “interpreted as a reasonable baseline case that can be compared with the cases that include 
alternative assumptions.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2019, U.S. Dept. of 
Energy, 1, 5 (Jan. 2019) https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/aeo2019.pdf.Ftech [hereinafter Annual Energy 
Outlook].   
40 Id. at 12.  
41 Id. at 13. 
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favorable conditions such as state level renewable portfolio standards, federal level production 
and investment tax credits, and greater scales of economies associated with more widespread 
use.42  While these trends towards increasing renewable energy are significant, the reference case 
does assume the existence of a stable regulatory and legal environment, which may be fallible. 
Additionally, even if these trends hold true it is important to evaluate and understand the policies 
driving these changes as our ability to make adjustments in our electricity generation has 
significant impacts for global climate change.   
 
Energy and Climate Change  
 
 First, coined in 1975, by geochemist Wallace Broecker,43 climate change has quickly 
become known as one of the greatest threats facing the world today. While the impacts of 
climate change are wide-ranging some of the most severe impacts will come from rising sea 
levels, increasing storm severity, desertification, and global biodiversity loss. These impacts and 
others will have severe economic consequences.  
 Sea level rise is being accelerated by climate change at an unprecedented rate. Records 
show the rate at which seas are rising has almost doubled since 1993.44 This trend is only 
expected to continue. Sea level rise is a major threat as almost half of the population of the U.S. 
currently lives in densely populated coastal areas that are characterized by vulnerability to sea 
level rise. 45 Rising sea level pose two particularly salient problems. First, higher “background 
                                               
42 See id.   
43 NASA, What’s in a Name? Global Warming vs. Climate Change, https://pmm.nasa.gov/education/articles/whats-
name-global-warming-vs-climate-change (last visited March 19, 2020).  
44 Id. 
45 NOAA, Climate change: global sea level, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-
change-global-sea-level (last visited Dec. 5, 2018).  
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water levels” will extend both the reach and severity of storm surges.46  Second, higher water 
levels pose an increased risk for flooding.  
Flooding is already the most common and the most expensive natural disaster in the 
U.S.47 Over 40 million American live in flood zones48 and nearly 90% of all disasters in the U.S. 
include some degree of flooding.49  For example, approximately 78% of the disaster the 
government declared in 2016, involved hurricanes or flooding. Furthermore, four of the declared 
storms exceed over $1 billion in damages each.50  The occurrence of these four separate $1 
billion events doubled the previous record for billion-dollar flood events in a single year.51 Sea 
level rise compounded by increasing storm severity is leading to consistently greater losses over 
time and putting more and more communities at risk.  
Desertification is also posing increased problems for those who live in areas bordering 
deserts.52 The Sahara Desert, the largest desert in the world, has grown by 10% since 1923 due to 
a combination of factors including human-induced climate change.53 Both sea level rise and 
desertification are contributing to “climate refugees”. Although officially unrecognized under 
international law, an average of 24 million people a year have been displaced by catastrophic 
                                               
46 Id. 
47 Laura Lightbody, Flooding disasters cost billions in 2016, PEW TRUST, Feb. 1 2017, 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2017/02/01/flooding-disasters-cost-billions-in-2016 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2018).  
48 YaleEnvironment360, 41 Million Americans live in flood zones – three times the FEMA estimate, Finds new 
study, E360 Digest, March 5, 2018, https://e360.yale.edu/digest/41-million-americans-live-in-flood-zones-three-
times-the-fema-estimate-finds-new-study. 
49 Michael S. Carolan, One step forward, two steps back: flood management policy in the United States,16 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 36 (2007). 
50 Lightbody, supra note 50.  
51 NOAA, Calculating the cost of weather and climate disasters, Oct. 12, 2018, 
https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/calculating-cost-weather-and-climate-disasters (last visited Dec. 5 2018).  





weather events including storms and droughts since 2008.54  This displacement has severe 
economic impacts both for the refugees as well as the countries tasked with relocating displaced 
populations.  
This is by no means a comprehensive overview of climate change impacts but rather a 
brief look at some of the more salient impacts.  We are already experiencing significant losses 
from climate change impacts and can only expect the losses to become more severe over time. 
As the salience of both the economic and emotional devastation of climate change grows, the 
need to develop meaningful energy generation policy grows as well.  
 The development of meaningful energy policy is essential as climate change is 
inextricably linked to electricity. The decisions we make regarding electricity generation will 
have serious implications for the severity of climate change. In 2017, 27.5% of U.S. greenhouse 
gas emissions came from electricity.55 This is the second single largest share of greenhouse gas 
emissions, barely falling behind transportation at 28.9%.56  However, what sets electricity apart 
from the other sectors of greenhouse gas emissions is the potential for demand to rise 
dramatically. While the AEO2019 Reference case predicts only modest growth in electricity 
demand, about 1% annually,57 the advent of electrification could result in significantly higher 
growth rates.  
 Vox writer, David Roberts, suggested that one way to address the growing threat of 
climate change is to “1. Clean up electricity, 2. Electrify Everything.”58  Electricity, which is 
                                               
54 Tim McDonnell, The refugees the world barely pays attention to, NPR, June 20, 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-that-the-world-barely-pays-
attention-to. 
55 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-
emissions. (last visited March 19, 2020).  
56 Id.  
57 Annual Energy Outlook, supra note 42. 
58 David Roberts, The key to tackling climate change: electrify everything, Oct. 27, 2017, VOX, 
https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=SCIC&u=unc_main&id=GALE%7CA504784944&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon.  
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more efficient than combustion, can be used to power everything from industry processes to 
transportation.59  A shift to electric transportation alone would cause electricity to rise from 27.% 
of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to over 75% of greenhouse gas emissions. While the goal of 
electrifying everything is likely still a ways away, there are two areas in which it looks like an 
increased demand for electricity is imminent: electric vehicles and cloud computing.  
  Between 2017 and 2018 the global electric car fleet grew by almost 2 million cars, 
resulting in more than 5 million electric vehicles in 2018.60  In 2018 alone the global electric 
vehicle fleet consumed an estimated 58 terawatt-hours of electricity, roughly equivalent to the 
total electricity demand of Sweden in 2017.61  While most of the global fleet is in China,62 the 
market share dedicated to electric vehicles in the U.S. is expected to grow rapidly.63  As electric 
vehicles continue to decline in price and remain cheaper to operate than traditional combustion 
engines these trends are only expected to continue, leading to significantly increased electricity 
demand. Some studies suggest that electricity demand could increase 38% by 2050, driven 
largely by increased adoption of electric vehicles.64 Beyond increased demand associated with 
electric vehicles, electricity demand is also predicted to rise in association with cloud computing.  
 As our society becomes increasingly reliant on cloud computing there is an associated 
increased demand in electricity use. Cloud data centers consume a significant amount of 
                                               
59 Id. 
60 International Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2019, 
https://webstore.iea.org/download/direct/2807?fileName=Global_EV_Outlook_2019.pdf. (last visited March 19, 
2020) [hereinafter Global EV Outlook 2019].    
61 Id.  
62 Peter Valdes-Dapena, By 2040, more than half of new cars will be electric, CNN BUSINESS, Sept. 6, 2019, 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/15/business/electric-car-outlook-bloomberg/index.html (“China is expected to 
account for 48% of all electric cars sold in 2025, but only 26% in 2040.”) 
63 Global EV Outlook 2019, supra note 60. 
64 Robert Walton, EVs could drive 38% rise in US electricity demand, DOE lab finds, UTILITY DIVE, July 10, 2018, 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/evs-could-drive-38-rise-in-us-electricity-demand-doe-lab-finds/527358/. 
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energy.65  U.S. data centers alone use more than 90 billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year, 
roughly equivalent to what could be generated by 34 500-megawatt coal-powered plants.66 
Currently global data centers use about 3% of the world’s electricity but this consumption is 
expected to double every four years.67  The explosion of artificial intelligence, the proliferation 
of internet-connected devices, and cloud computing are expected to further exacerbate data’s 
energy requirements and with it the effects of greenhouse gas emissions.  For example, every 
query on Google results in the emittance of 7 grams of carbon dioxide.68  A ten-minute YouTube 
video generates one gram of carbon dioxide.69 As the demand for internet access and cloud 
computing grows these numbers will only increase.   
 In conclusion, it is imperative that we find an effective solution to reduce carbon 
emissions in the electricity sector.  “Transitioning away from our current global energy system is 
of paramount importance . . . ‘the need for the ‘next’ energy transition is widely apparent as 
current energy systems are simply unsustainable on all accounts of social, economic, and 
environmental criteria.”70  While market forces and technology availability will undoubtedly 
influence the shape of this transition, it is too important to leave to non-directable forces such as 
these. In 2016, the International Energy Agency said that if “action to reduce CO2 emissions is 
not taken before 2017, all the allowable CO2 emissions would be locked-in by energy 
infrastructure existing at that time.”71  Although this dire prediction has yet to be realized, it does 
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highlight the time sensitive nature of our energy transition and the importance of getting it right 
the first time around. Sovacool et al. reviewed ten case studies of energy transitions, and found 
that transitions were highly context dependent and were influenced by a wide array of factors 
including aggressive planning, political will, stakeholder involvement, military conflict, energy 
accidents, global crises, economic development, and market forces.72  The key, though, is that 
only some of these forces can be anticipated and used effectively, thereby allowing for goal-
oriented policy development.  
 
The Importance of Goal-oriented Policy Development  
 
The increasingly damaging effects of global climate change, coupled with the emissions 
potential of electricity generation, have made it clear that the US needs to transition its energy 
sector towards a lower carbon system. Despite this clear necessity, there are differing opinions 
concerning how to affect such a transition. Most of these opinions differ concerning the role that 
market forces should play in driving systematic change.73  Capitalism is deeply ingrained in the 
American psyche, and some suggest its current pervasiveness and dominance is unrivaled in the 
modern world.74  As a result there is a common belief that the market forces associated with 
capitalism are ultimately best suited to facilitate the transition to a lower carbon system. 
However, this faith in capitalism is likely somewhat misplaced, as climate change has been 
referred to as the “greatest externality the world has ever seen,” and capitalism is a system built 
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on keeping “the real (environmental) costs of economic activities and their environmental 
liability off the accounting books.”75 Beyond historic failures of market forces to create desired 
change,76 market forces are especially ill-suited when it comes to the energy transition due their 
susceptibility to exogenous shocks and frequent misguided market valuations.  
The unexpected impact of exogenous shocks can complicate market guided transitions 
due to their unpredictability and potentially dramatic effects. Exogenous shocks are external 
stressors to the system such as political instability, commodity shortages, or natural disasters that 
have been shown to have profound impacts on our energy system. In fact, exogenous shocks 
“have often dominated the incremental benefits that regulatory reform can provide.”77  For 
example, shifts in the price of gas and new technology have more significantly impacted 
efficiency at power plants than regulatory reforms.78 While this might seem like it would elevate 
the effectiveness of exogenous shocks and market forces, it is actually the primary problem. 
Without goal-driven regulatory reform our energy system would simply react to external events. 
We need policy to shape and, if necessary, limit the effects of unforeseeable exogenous events. 
Otherwise a single event could have lasting impacts on our energy system. For example, the 
Fukushima disaster caused widespread panic and led to the phaseout of nuclear power in several 
countries despite the relative safety of nuclear power and its importance in lower carbon 
electricity generation.  
 Beyond the risks associated with exogenous shocks, allowing market forces to guide our 
energy transition implicitly condones that which the market values despite the fact that this may 
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not reflect what we want to prioritize in our energy generation system. Capitalism prioritizes the 
accumulation of wealth through competitive enterprise,79 and as a result “[c]onservation in the 
aggregate is impossible for capitalism.”80 Our current system of energy production is rife with 
unincorporated externalities, which means that capitalism is not only valuing the “wrong” things 
such as wealth accumulation but is also failing to account for the real cost of our energy 
generation.81  Additionally, beyond failing to incorporate known externalities, relying on market 
forces does not allow for the incorporation of different values. Existing policies have 
traditionally focused on providing energy that is reliable and affordable. Incorporating new 
metrics, such as clean, into an existing system can be especially difficult due to existing 
valuations.   
 In contrast, market proponents argue that these externalities can be priced into the market 
through measures such as carbon pricing. While this would represent a step in the right direction 
it is likely insufficient to overcome existing barriers such as the historic reliance on fossil fuel 
technologies and the institutional constraints that affect project finance decisions.82 Furthermore, 
it assumes that if markets can be structured such that they take all negative externalities into 
account the market will achieve a maximum level of efficiency, thereby finding the “optimal 
way to address pollution.”83  Even if this could be achieved it forecloses the option of structuring 
our energy production system in order to meet certain predefined goals.    
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In order to meet these predefined energy goals, we need to develop targeted energy 
policy. When envisioning the energy policies of the future there are two primary decisions that 
have to be made. First, the level at which policy is implemented has significant implications for 
both the structure and efficacy of a given policy. Second, the type of policy (i.e. whether it is 
technology-driven or technology-agnostic) will define our energy generation system for decades 
to come.  
 
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE  
 
 By the end of the 1920s almost every state in the U.S. had passed energy regulations 
governing their own in-state energy utilities.84 Then, in 1927, a dispute between the Public 
Utilities Commission of Rhode Island and the Attleboro Steam & Electric Company of 
Massachusetts exposed a gap in regulatory authority, whereby monopoly utilities could sell 
electricity across state lines without governmental review since regulation by either state was 
considered a burden on interstate commerce.85  This lapse in regulation became known as the 
“Attleboro gap,” and while Congress quickly closed the “gap” with the Federal Power Act, doing 
so carved out a new role for the federal government in energy regulation.86  The newly 
established concurrent roles for state and federal governments began what has become a long 
tradition of energy regulation litigation focused on maintaining mutually exclusive silos of 
authority for both state and federal regulators.87  Under this system, federal agencies maintained 
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exclusive jurisdiction over interstate or wholesale operations, and states retained their exclusive 
jurisdiction over intrastate or retail operations.88  When a question or dispute arises over what 
belongs to whom, Courts engage in a formalistic inquiry to determine on which side of the 
jurisdictional “bright line” the challenged initiative should be placed.89  This “bright line” 
approach, whereby regulation is siloed into either federal or state jurisdiction, has been the 
predominant approach to energy regulation since the “Attleboro gap” came into being. Yet as 
energy regulation and energy generation initiatives became increasingly complex the line 
between federal and state jurisdiction has become increasingly blurry.  
The recent increase in blurriness is due in large part to three recent Supreme Court 
cases90 in which the Supreme Court suggested that perhaps this was more of a dotted line, or a 
double line or perhaps, not a line at all. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. was decided in 2015 and is 
often considered the first case to hint at the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction rather than a 
bright line delineation.91  In ONEOK several purchasers of retail natural gas alleged that natural 
gas traders were manipulating the market through false reports.92  The purchasers sought relief 
under state level antitrust laws but the natural gas traders filed for summary judgment, arguing 
the purchasers’ claims were preempted by the federal Natural Gas Act.93  This raised a difficult 
legal question as the alleged false reports and associated market manipulation “affected both 
wholesale sales—the traditional purview of federal regulators—and retail sales—which FERC is 
not authorized to regulate.”94  In holding that the state antitrust claims were not preempted, the 
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Supreme Court provided a new test for evaluating when state law impermissibly interferes with 
the sphere of federal regulation.95 Instead of just affirming the historical bright line distinction 
the Court held that moving forward “courts must consider ‘the target at which the state law aims 
in determining whether [the] law is pre-empted.’”96  This focus is more akin to a balancing test 
and appears to endorse concurrent state and federal regulation, at least in the pursuit of 
anticompetitive conduct in interstate gas markets.97 
 Roughly one year later, the Supreme Court significantly strengthened its language in 
ONEOK regarding concurrent jurisdiction in FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA)98.  
EPSA is widely recognized for upholding FERC’s “demand response” policies, which many 
believe are essential to reducing carbon emissions and managing the price of electricity.99  In 
order to smooth peak energy use in wholesale electricity markets FERC enacted a demand 
response rule that allowed it to balance supply and demand by paying consumers to reduce their 
electricity consumption at peak times.100  A trade association challenged the rule arguing that 
paying retail customers not to consume electricity intruded on state authority and that “FERC 
ha[d] ‘usurped state power’ over retail markets.”101  When it applied the traditional dual 
federalism framework (i.e. the bright line approach) ,the D.C. Circuit agreed with the trade 
association, finding that because “FERC's rule entails direct regulation of the retail market—a 
matter exclusively within state control—it exceeds the Commission's authority.”102 According to 
the D.C. Circuit the rule represented an impermissible infringement on the jurisdiction of states. 
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On appeal, however, the Supreme Court disagreed, forcefully rejecting the historic bright line 
approach.103  Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that demand response would influence 
the state’s retail markets, it upheld the policy based on FERC’s authority “to ensure that rules or 
practices ‘affecting’ wholesale rates are just and reasonable.”104  Although the Court 
acknowledged the potentially “near-infinite breadth”105 of the statute, it reasoned that limiting it 
to practices that “directly” affect wholesale rates would create sufficient bounds. Furthermore, 
the Court found that FERC’s demand response rule met its newly articulated standard with 
“room to spare,”106 suggesting an expanded role for FERC moving forward.    
Finally, in Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC107  the Court once again sided with 
FERC, further broadening federal jurisdiction. In Hughes, Maryland passed an initiative to 
incentivize the construction of new electricity generation facilities within Maryland based on 
concerns over the phase-out of several older coal-fired plants and their difficulty in importing 
electricity due to grid congestion.108  Maryland guaranteed new generators a fixed contract price 
by agreeing to make up the difference between electricity rates on the wholesale market and the 
contract price via a subsidy payment.109 The Court held that Maryland’s incentive was 
impermissible, stating that the incentive interfered with wholesale electricity rates, which were 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of FERC.110  However, the Court did take pains to stress the 
narrowness of its holding, suggesting that states may pursue other means of encouraging 
electricity generation and that Maryland’s failed due to only a small but “fatal defect”.111  While 
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some read the opinion in Hughes as an attempt to reign in growing federal jurisdiction, it does so 
by siding with FERC and simply suggesting other untested options for states may be possible, 
rendering it a relatively weak attempt at best.  
Together, these three cases either extend or confirm federal jurisdiction while further 
eroding the previous bright line analysis that historically supported dual jurisdiction.112 This 
historic bright line analysis is further complicated by shifts away from the traditional vertically 
integrated industry structure.113 As technology advances, our electricity generation system 
becomes more complex. For example, electricity generation resources can now simultaneously 
provide both retail and wholesale services, making it exceedingly difficult to determine where to 
draw the line.114 These Supreme Court cases, coupled with advances in technology and changes 
in business practices, have brought the question of jurisdictional level to the forefront of the 
energy debate necessitating an in-depth analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of federal- 
versus state-level policy. 
The advantages and disadvantages should be evaluated in regard to standardization, 
distributional impacts, and scale as these factors are heavily dependent on the level of 
implementation. Standardization represents one of the key differences between state and federal 
level policies, as a state-centric approach is often synonymous with variation in that it allows 
states to implement their own policies as they see fit. Similarly, varying distributional impacts 
among states is inherent in federalism, as a federal-level policy has the potential to help or harm 
states differently. Finally, scale is an important factor in two ways. First, scale is often a central 
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determinate of cost, which drives feasibility and political viability. Second, scale is particularly 
important with regard to the effectiveness of policy insofar as the ultimate goal is to reduce 
emissions in order to mitigate climate change, as climate change is a global problem and likely 






  Federal energy regulation allows for the development of economies of scale and also 
conveys significant jurisdictional benefits. Economies of scale are predicated on the belief that 
with increased size comes increased efficiency and ultimately increased returns. It is a classic 
“bigger is better” argument. Federal-level policies are better able to take advantage of economies 
of scale, as they aggregate all of the states and their resources.  These proffered advantages of 
scale can be conceptualized using Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). These are popular 
policies that are used to increase clean energy by requiring retail electricity suppliers to generate 
a certain percentage of electricity from renewable sources or purchase tradable credits that 
represent an equivalent amount of renewable generation.115  Currently, these policies exist only 
at the state level, despite research that suggests that the efficacy of these programs would be 
increased at the federal level for several reasons.116  First, the sheer size of the United States and 
the associated potential for an economies-of-scale effect suggest that a federal RPS would yield 
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significant results.117 Advocates of a federal RPS program also argue that larger renewable 
energy markets would lead to increased demand for renewables, allowing the U.S. to develop a 
strong domestic manufacturing base.118 Furthermore, a unified RPS standard would facilitate the 
highest and best use of each state’s individual resources by allowing them to more easily look 
outside state boundaries for renewable generation. This would also contribute to reduced costs as 
new generation facilities would be constructed in areas with the best natural resource availability 
with the least cost constraints.119   
Second, while some states currently do allow utilities to take advantage of broader 
renewable energy markets through renewable energy certificates (REC) trading programs, these 
programs only hint at what would be possible under a federal RPS, as their effectiveness is 
limited by their level of implementation and lack of standardization.  For example, there is no 
way to track “clean electricity” once it has been put onto the grid.120  While REC trading 
programs attempt to answer this dilemma by splitting green energy into two separate revenue 
streams (actual electricity, measured in kilowatt hours and greenness measured in RECs), there is 
no guaranteed way to track effectiveness,121 and as a result these programs are susceptible to 
double-counting. Purchasing RECs is therefore not a guarantee that end-purchasers are using 
renewable energy or even reducing carbon emissions overall.  
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There is also no standardization among states concerning what qualifies as renewable 
energy for inclusion as a REC.122 For example, a recent review of RPS mandates found that 
while most states agree that wind, biomass, methane, and solar generation qualify as renewable, 
that is about where the consensus ends.123  Only thirteen states count renewables-based 
cogeneration while only twenty-three count ocean and tidal energy.124  The plethora of 
occasionally contradictory definitions of renewable energy at the state level complicates the 
development of a meaningful REC market and adds additional administrative costs.125  Finally, 
even when states agree on the validity of an individual REC, those states may assign it a different 
shelf life. For example, Michigan assigns its RECs a shelf life of three years, while Arizona 
allows for a potentially indefinite period of validity.126   
While state-level RPSs and RECs clearly lack the benefits of standardization and scale 
that stem from federal involvement, they have been successful in increasing the amount of 
renewable electricity on the grid. While specific streams of renewable energy are difficult to 
track to an end user, the construction of new renewable facilities is not, and RPS programs do 
incentivize the construction of new renewable facilities. Furthermore, although not standardized, 
varying renewable definitions do allow individual states to capitalize on and prioritize in-state 
resources. Variation allows states to define renewable energy in a way that most benefits their 
individual state. However, despite these advantages a federal RPS standard would still likely 
convey greater benefits in regard to the ultimate goal of effectively and efficiently reducing 
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emissions. A federal RPS standard would provide a unified system, thereby allowing the 
beneficial effects of economies of scale and standardization. Both of these advantages would 
likely lead to cost saving and increased efficiency, which are critically important to the timely 
reduction of emissions.  
 Beyond the benefits that could be obtained from nationalizing state-level RPS standards, 
increased jurisdictional pushback from the courts may leave federal standards as the only 
meaningful path forward for incentivizing significant renewable energy generation. As 
mentioned previously, the once bright line that divided state and federal energy jurisdiction has 
begun to erode leaving more space and control for federal regulators. This has led to a slow 
expansion of federal jurisdiction. This shift towards prioritizing federal policy – coupled with the 
idea that FERC could have a greater influence if it chose to – further increases uncertainty for 
states.127 Additionally, the increasing technological complexity that helped to give rise to the 
federal versus state debate is only likely to continue.   
 
Federal Disadvantages  
 
Increasingly partisan politics are credited with many policy failures, and this is especially 
true for energy policy at the federal level. For example, “the median Republican is now more 
conservative than 97% of Democrats, the median Democrat is more liberal than 95% of 
Republicans.”128  This decrease in bipartisanship overlap means that there is less and less room 
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for compromise and forward progress. As is the case with so many issues, increasing 
partisanship coupled with the outsized ability of special interests to affect policy through 
lobbying129 exemplifies the lack of political will that would be necessary to pass meaningful 
energy legislation at the federal level. There have been over two dozen failed federal proposals 
for a national RPS standard,130 and while it seemed briefly like that one would be adopted,131 it 
now seems very unlikely.  
Moreover, even if someone did manage to muster the political will to pass federal energy 
policy, it would likely immediately be susceptible to “flip-flopping” and may also be problematic 
due to its limiting effect on ambitious state policies. Flip-flopping, as it is used here, refers to the 
sometimes dramatic changes in policy that occur when governmental control shifts from one 
political party to another. Energy policy is highly susceptible to the negative impacts of flip-
flopping because it requires significant long-range planning. For example, the definition of what 
constitutes renewable energy is susceptible to political will, making it possible to rely on a 
definition and take action only to have it thwarted at the next election. This phenomenon would 
significantly undermine the advantages of standardization associated with federal-level policies. 
While highly problematic, flipflopping is not unique to federal level policies as states are also 
susceptible to flipflopping. However, the effects are somewhat ameliorated at the state-level, as 
federalism inherently limits the impacts.  Furthermore, at the federal level FERC has in many 
ways lost some of its status as an “independent” agency. Although defined as independent by 
statute,132 it has become increasingly political, with members consistently voting along party 
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lines. Beyond the political leanings of its commissioners it has also been hamstrung by politics 
and currently has only three of five commissioners for the fourth time in roughly the last twenty 
years.133 
Beyond the unlikeliness that a federal energy policy will come to fruition and possible 
concerns associated with flipflopping, there is also concern that a federal energy policy could 
limit particularly motivated states. A growing number of states are passing increasingly 
ambitious energy policies, including nearly ten states that have passed bills pledging to generate 
100 percent of their state’s electricity from carbon-free sources.134  However ambitious a federal 
policy may be, it is highly unlikely that it would match the commitment of these states to carbon-
free energy. This concern is embodied in a current legal dispute over automobile emission 
standards.  Auto emission rules are dictated by Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) 
standards, which set the average fuel economy in miles per gallon of the vehicles in a 
manufacturer’s fleet.135  Although these standards are set nationally, California was granted an 
exception under the Clean Air Act allowing it to set its own air emission standards.136  California 
has been implementing its own standards since then, and approximately fifteen states currently 
follow at least some portion of California’s vehicle emissions standards.137  However, this past 
year, likely in response to pressure from the automobile industry, President Trump announced 
his intent to revoke California’s ability to set its own standards.138  This announcement led 
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California, joined by 22 other states, to file suit challenging the administration’s move.139  Easily 
conceptualized as one battle in a war that pits California and other like-minded states against the 
Trump administration’s efforts to roll back environmental protections, this exemplifies the 
problems that federal policies can create. This concern can be significantly ameliorated, though, 
by crafting a federal policy that functions as a floor rather than a ceiling. For example, floor 
preemption is inherent in federal environmental law140 and allows individual states to continue to 
innovate so long as they meet basic federal goals.141 The Clean Water Act (CWA) is one of the 
seminal examples of such a policy.142 The CWA sets minimum federal standards for states 
regarding effluent limitations but specifically envisions an active role for states, allowing them to 
set their own standards as long as they do not fall below the federal floor.143 A similarly-
structured energy policy would usher in many of the advantages associated with a federal-level 
policy while giving states the flexibility to pursue more ambitious policies should they wish to 
do so.  
Finally, a uniform federal energy policy could also unfairly burden some states based on 
a few key factors.  First, states that have been resistant to embracing renewable energy will have 
a significantly larger gap to close than more progressive states. These states may have also made 
the decision to build their state economies around carbon-intensive processes, which they could 
lose under a federal standard. Furthermore, these states are likely those with the least capacity for 
absorbing such economic setbacks. West Virginia, for example, has the highest carbon intensity 
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of energy supply144 of all 50 states at 79 kg of CO2 per MMBtu and the second highest carbon 
intensity of its economy,145 suggesting that West Virginia relies heavily on coal for both 
electricity generation and economic output. West Virginia is also currently ranked 46th in 
unemployment rates146 and has one of the highest rates of poverty in the country, well above the 
national average.147 States like West Virginia would be both the most burdened by federal energy 
policy and likely the least able to recover from that burden.   
While a uniform federal policy has the potential to handicap states like West Virginia, it 
could also take state-specific factors into account. For example, the Clean Power Plan allowed 
individual states to choose how to meet their goals and offered emissions trading avenues for 
doing so in order to lessen burdens on individual states.148 While states will have different 
starting points, there are existing federal policies that showcase how federal policies can be 




 States have historically played a dominant role in regulating and encouraging energy 
generation within their borders. States had original oversight authority for regulated utilities, 
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market structure, siting of new facilities, and rate setting and taxation.149 Furthermore, states 
have used these powers to promote renewable energy development and energy efficiency 
measures for decades.150  
 
State Advantages  
 
 Many believe that a state-level, rather than federal-level policy would be a more fitting 
venue for renewable energy policy, as states have historically been tasked with making these 
decisions. Indeed, states offer a number of advantages that would be difficult to realize on a 
federal scale. Two particularly salient advantages of state policies are the greater flexibility and 
innovation present at the state level and the ability of states to more directly capitalize on public 
support.  
 States have always been considered valuable arenas for flexibility and innovation as they 
have been historically known as laboratories of democracy. Justice Brandeis was credited with 
coining the phrase when he described the importance of state innovation:  
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. 
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the 
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.151 
 
This conceptualization of courageous states has largely come to fruition thus far. Although 
numerous states have pursued energy policies, no two states have “uniform profiles in terms of 
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actual rates of greenhouse gas emissions growth or climate policy adoptions,”152 suggesting that 
states are both innovating and seeking tailored solutions.  Innovation in state energy policy was 
displayed early on when California introduced competition into its electricity market in 1996.153  
Unfortunately, this early embrace of competition cost California significantly, supporting Justice 
Brandeis’ idea that brave states have also on occasion borne the risks of brave new policies 
thereby insulating the country as a whole from risk.154  While California’s energy crisis involved 
more than California, becoming known as the Western Energy Crisis, it did not affect the whole 
country, showcasing the valuable role states can play in both enacting novel policies as well as 
absorbing the backlash from failed policies.  
 Beyond their ability to function as incubators of innovation, states have also been able to 
capitalize on a groundswell of public support for renewable energy, allowing them to be 
increasingly ambitious in their targets. There is significant and rising support for renewable 
energy: the public is increasingly clamoring for 100 percent commitments to renewable energy155 
and states represent the ideal outlet for this clamoring.156  State-level policy can be created 
through a wider variety of approaches, including direct democracy as well as litigation designed 
to confront federal institutions.157  Indeed, ballot propositions are becoming increasingly popular 
in advancing clean energy initiatives.158  While currently states appear uniquely positioned to 
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capitalize on public support for renewable energy initiatives there is hope that this state-level 
support will rise to the federal level.  
 
State Disadvantages  
 
 Notwithstanding their unique advantages, state-level policies are often plagued by 
disadvantages as well. Three of the main disadvantages are: (1) the race to the bottom and 
regulatory “leakage”; (2) problems of scale; and (3) jurisdictional disadvantages.  
 While the relative independence of states gives them an opportunity to be innovators it 
can also give them the opportunity to attract business to their detriment. Commonly described as 
the “race to the bottom,” this phenomenon occurs when, in order to maintain the economic 
competitiveness of their states, regulators “may drop regulatory standards . . . creating a race to 
the bottom . . . [that] lead[s] to levels of protection more lax than citizens would pick if not 
confronted with such competition.”159  For example, in terms of energy policy, a state may 
actively speak out against renewable energy in order to maintain or attract fossil fuel industries 
to the state.  The “race to the bottom” is also commonly associated with policies that attempt to 
eliminate social evils,160 such as those energy policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions.  The 
“race to the bottom” often results in a range of sub-par policies that facilitate industry rather than 
long-term welfare. For example, Pennsylvania, which has a strong historical reliance on coal, 
passed an RPS that included coalmine methane as a Tier II renewable.161  This policy, ostensibly 
passed to support the mining industry in the state, generated a significant amount of controversy. 
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It was even referred to as one of the “dirtiest RPS” in the nation by several environmental 
groups.162  This policy, while beneficial for certain industries, likely fails to protect the long-term 
welfare of Pennsylvania’s citizens.  
However, states that pursue “good” policies in light of long-term welfare are also 
susceptible to the flipside of the “race to the bottom,” regulatory “leakage”. Regulatory 
“leakage” occurs when states enact beneficial policies but fail to reap the benefits from those 
policies due to the actions of the surrounding states.163 Davies et al. provides the following 
illustrative example: 
In the case of renewable energy, if Missouri, for example, adopted an RPS but 
Tennessee, Arkansas, and Nebraska did not, the risk would be that Missouri’s law 
would fail to change the market. The total amount of renewable generation might 
not increase—or would not increase as much as Missouri sought—because rather 
than building their own facilities, Missouri utilities would import power from 
existing generators in surrounding states.164 
 
These two interrelated concepts illustrate some of the problems that arise under state level 
policies and the associated lack of standardization. A uniform renewable energy policy would 
prevent damaging competition among states while also allowing ambitious states to realize the 
true impact of beneficial policies.  
 Another disadvantage of state-level policies is that they may simply be ill-suited to 
address a global scale problem. The impacts of climate change are not limited by state 
boundaries, and therefore neither should our efforts to reduce those emissions be.  Attempting to 
reduce emissions and mitigate climate change primarily within the confines of state-level policy 
is unlikely to effectuate real change, as air emissions disperse globally. These emissions then 
cause global impacts regardless of where they originated. States that have implemented 
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renewable energy policies such as an RPS commonly cite climate change as justification for their 
programs.165 Yet state-level RPS programs are a piecemeal approach at best, according to the 
matching principle.  
In an attempt to determine the correct allocation of regulatory authority between federal 
and state government, environmental literature has historically relied on the “matching 
principle”.166 The matching principle encourages scale matching whereby “the size of the 
geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate 
governmental level for responding to the pollution.”167 Carbon pollution is tied to global 
warming which is a global scale problem indicating a higher level of regulatory authority is more 
appropriate. Furthermore, state-level policies create state-level markets, which often favor in-
state generation or place differential values on RECs depending on state-specific factors. This 
makes state-level policies less valuable in other jurisdictions and ultimately serves to “diminish 
the national commitment to renewables by curbing their trade.”168  Significant emissions 
reductions are needed in order to mitigate the impacts of global climate change, which illustrates  
the need for federal-level policy, as such significant emissions reductions would benefit from 
uniformity and economies of scale.   
  Finally, one of the greatest disadvantages to state-level policy may be increasing 
jurisdictional constraints. The previous analysis indicated that as the judicial system moves away 
from the historic “bright line” analysis, certain elements of state jurisdiction are become more 
uncertain at best and possibly more tenuous at worst. Beyond concerns over FERC’s expanding 
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role, many states are limited in their ability to incentivize and encourage in-state renewable 
energy generation by Dormant Commerce Clause concerns.169  The Commerce Clause disallows 
state protectionism of local resources and businesses making it difficult for states to take 
action.170 A number of states have already enacted “constitutionally questionable” policies.171 
For example, “Arizona gives extra compliance credit to utilities that use certain facilities 
installed or built in the state,” and “Ohio flatly preferences in-state resources,” requiring in its 
RPS that “[a]t least one-half of the renewable energy resources shall be met through facilities 
located in [Ohio].”172  These state policies likely run afoul of the Commerce Clause and are 
presently susceptible to constitutional challenges. States should exercise caution when pursuing 
protectionist policies and be aware that they could be overturned. This could also make states 
wary of passing meaningful energy policy out of fear that they might unconstitutionally interfere 
with the Commerce Clause. This is especially problematic since climate change requires bold 
actions that might not be feasible at the state level given these constraints.  
 
Federal versus State Conclusions & Implications  
 
 Federal Level Implementation State Level Implementation  
Advantages • Economies of scale  
• Jurisdictional advantages 
• Flexibility and innovation  
• Direct public support  
Disadvantages • Partisanship and flip-flopping 
• Could limit ambitious states 
• Race to the bottom and regulatory 
“leakage” 
• Limits of scale  
• Jurisdictional disadvantages 
Figure 1 - Comparison of Federal and State Advantages and Disadvantages 
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 While the “correct” level of implementation for renewable energy policy is likely a 
matter of opinion, the evaluation of federal advantages and disadvantages compared to state 
advantages and disadvantages is persuasive in its support for a federal-level policy. Federal-level 
policies offer important advantages in terms of scale and uniformity, which are likely to yield the 
most efficient emissions reductions. First, the primary advantages of a federal policy (economies 
of scale and jurisdictional benefits) are difficult to replicate at any other level. Economies of 
scale offer numerous advantages that are poised to overcome some of the most outspoken 
challenges to renewable energy, including cost. These advantages arise from aggregating the 
states and viewing the country as a whole and therefore could not be replicated at the state level 
with the same meaning. Additionally, the aforementioned court cases draw a picture of a 
potentially waning role for state regulation. Furthermore, there are currently states that may 
already be running afoul of the Commerce Clause in an attempt to encourage in-state energy 
regulation with regard to the law as it stands now. Moreover, many of the characteristics of 
energy generation are associated with a critical role for the federal government as energy 
generation has important implications for our nation’s economic wellbeing, national security, 
and future progress. The law is evolving and all these factors point towards a stronger role for the 
federal government in energy regulation and courts thus far have shown they are ready to 
accommodate that larger role.  
Although there are federal disadvantages, they can be ameliorated in a way that the state 
disadvantages cannot. Partisanship and associated “flip-flopping” have always been challenges 
to enacting new policies, but both can be overcome. The energy generation industry itself might 
serve as an effective backstop against “flip-flopping” once a federal policy has been passed. 
Nearly 40% of utilities ranked “uncertainty over market conditions & regulations for future 
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generation” as the “single greatest challenge associated with our changing fuel mix,”173 
indicating that uncertainty is more concerning for utilities that many technical challenges.  This 
fear over uncertainty could be harnessed to prevent “flip-flopping,” as corporate lobbyists have 
significant power in either effectuating or preventing policy changes.174 
 Finally, the disadvantages associated with state-level policies likely outweigh the 
advantages, as long as the primary goal is emissions reductions. First, penned in by the “race to 
the bottom” on one side and regulatory “leakage” on the other side, states are hampered by a lack 
of uniformity in regard to both progressive and traditional energy policies. Second, climate 
change is a global problem that is likely best addressed at a global level due to the sheer 
magnitude of the problem and the dispersibility of air emissions. Furthermore, climate change 
will have disparate impacts in states across the U.S., further compelling the need for a federal- 
rather than a state-level approach to renewable energy and associated emissions reductions. 
Finally, the jurisdictional disadvantages at the state level are pronounced and likely to grow even 
more pronounced in the future.  
The advantages associated with state-level policies are unlikely to outweigh any of the 
above disadvantages. Although states are best suited to experiment with new policies and pursue 
innovative approaches, it is now time for the country as a whole to take the best of these existing 
policy experiments and implement them on a national level where they can be more effective due 
to country-wide uniformity. States currently exhibit a wide range of policies and incentives 
designed to encourage renewable generation and have in effect served their role as laboratories 
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of democracy. The translation of state policies to the federal level is a natural evolution and a key 
component of the theory of innovation itself.175 In conclusion, a federal-level policy approach to 
renewable energy generation would likely yield significant advantages over a similar state-level 
policy. 
 
TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN VERSUS TECHNOLOGY-AGNOSTIC 
 
There are a multitude of different policy approaches designed to either encourage 
additional renewable energy generation or discourage disfavored types of generation. These 
policies can broadly be divided into two categories: technology-driven policies and technology-
agnostic policies. Although they both have the same overarching goal of encouraging more 
“clean” energy, they have their own respective advantages and disadvantages.  While 
determining how effective a specific policy type will be prior to implementation can prove 
challenging,176 it is important to at least identify and contemplate the specific goals of proposed 
or enacted policies.  
 
Technology-driven Policies  
 
  Technology-driven policies are policies that focus on encouraging specific emerging 
technologies with the goal of helping them become more market ready. For example, almost all 
RPSs are technology-driven policies, as they identify specific types of technology that allow a 
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utility to comply with the standards. North Carolina, for example, defines a renewable energy 
resource via a list of specifically enumerated technologies that includes solar electric, solar 
thermal, hydropower, ocean current, biomass resources, etc.177  Additionally, North Carolina 
includes a specific carveout requiring 0.2% of “the total electric power in kilowatt hours sold to 
retail electric customers in the State [be] . . . supplied . . . by swine waste.”178  This is clearly a 
technology-driven policy because it specifically favors certain technologies that might be 
particularly beneficial to the state.179   
Technology-driven policies can be further divided into market-pull policies, which 
“strive to increase demand in the marketplace for new technologies and provide incentives for 
users to adopt them,” and technology push policies, which focus more on the development rather 
than the market side.180  Whether they are pulling or pushing, technology-driven policies offer a 




 Technology-driven policies are advantageous because they: (1) allow politicians to 
capitalize on public support for iconic renewable technology as well as capitalize on economic 
growth and job gains; (2) directly target barriers to renewable energy development; and (3) are 
important for correcting historical subsidizations and ensuring progress.  
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 First, passing technology-driven policies allows politicians to demonstrate support for 
specific renewable technologies that may have higher public support. For example, surveys show 
that a significant percentage of Americans support solar panel farms and wind turbines (89 and 
83 % respectively181), suggesting that politicians may be able to gain significant support for 
policies that promote those specific technologies.  However, significantly fewer (only 43%) of 
Americans support nuclear power plants, which would likely be included in a technology-
agnostic policy but not necessarily in a technology-driven policy. As long as Americans’ support 
of renewable energy is technology-based, politicians may be more likely to be able to pass 
technology-driven policies. For example, in Washington state voters overwhelmingly rejected a 
carbon-tax ballot proposal for the third time in November 2018 and yet only six months later the 
governor signed what was, at the time, one of the strongest RPS measures into law.182  This hints 
at the strong differences in support for differing policy types.  
Furthermore, technology-driven policies are positively associated with jobs and economic 
gains. Specific, renewable energy technologies, such as solar, are labor-intensive meaning they 
typically create more jobs per every dollar invested than conventional generation technologies 
and they often capitalize on native resources meaning those energy dollars stay within the 
community.183 North Carolina, for example, passed technology-driven policies that were 
especially favorable to solar generation, and in Quarter 12019 had 553 solar companies provide 
6,457 jobs and generate almost $3 billion in revenue.184  Demonstrable economic benefits of 
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specific renewable energy technologies combined with the positive public perceptions tied to 
those specific technologies gives them an advantage when it comes to political support.  
 Second, technology-driven polices are also significant because they may allow for the 
specific targeting of barriers to renewable energy development. One of the major remaining 
barriers to renewable energy generation such as solar and wind is their intermittent nature.185  
Intermittency reduces the security and reliability of production and distribution because energy is 
not always available.186  Energy storage is seen as a critical solution as it would decrease the 
unpredictability associated with intermittency and ensure availability of energy.187  The ability to 
pass policies directly targeting the development and inclusion of energy storage in electricity 
generation would facilitate the development of entire systems rather than simply the proliferation 
of just solar panels or wind turbines,188 hopefully resulting in more meaningful emissions 
reductions.  
 Finally, technology-driven policies are important because they are critical in overcoming 
the historic subsidization of conventional energy technology and are difficult to repeal. 
Innovation, by its very nature, tends to create positive externalities.189 These positive 
externalities, also referred to as spillovers, are particularly significant in the context of 
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innovation.190  This means that historic innovation in conventional energy generation 
technologies, such as coal-fired powerplants, has likely inevitably lead to numerous spillovers 
both within that industry. 191  This means that conventional generation technologies have likely 
been continuously benefiting from early innovation within those fields. This concept whereby 
“innovation builds on itself over time, developing path dependencies in which past innovations 
make present ones more valuable, with past innovations attracting similar, more advanced 
innovations” has been referred to as “innovation snowballing.” 192 Innovation snowballing 
suggests that technology-agnostic policies, such as carbon taxes, will be insufficient to correct 
for what has been centuries of support for conventional dirtier technology such as coal.193  While 
the goal of energy policy is broader than simply correcting for past innovation decisions, it is 
important to recognize the unevenness of the current playing field. Technology-driven policies 
could play an essential role in helping to level this playing field, thereby allowing and 
encouraging future cleantech innovators and hopefully ultimately creating a snowball effect of 
clean tech innovation.194   
Technology-agnostic policies are also beneficial because they have the potential to lead 
to ensconced change. Once established, new innovations are difficult to repeal as spillovers from 
existing innovations tend to drive further innovations in that area.195 Once an innovation is 
present and has gained a foothold in the market it cannot be undone; innovation cannot be 
“unthought” and once the policies are there they will foster constituencies that will support more 
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robust climate policies.196  Technology-driven policies have the potential to capitalize on public 
support, overcome both technological and historical investment barriers to cleantech, and resist 




 Three of the major drawbacks to technology-driven policies are that they (1) limit 
flexibility; (2) require politicians to identify the “best” technologies to support ahead of 
widespread market adoption; and (3) may not be the most cost-effective option.  
First, technology-driven policies inherently limit flexibility by proscribing certain 
technologies thereby prioritizing them over others. Additionally, the selected technologies can be 
chosen for a variety of reasons, not all of which are necessarily accurate or comport with the 
community’s goals.197  Decisions regarding technology-driven policies may be “distorted by 
imperfect information as well as politico-economic constraints related to, among other things, 
distributional impacts and associated lobbying efforts of interest groups.”198  In other words, 
politicians may be unduly influenced by special interest groups, thereby selecting certain 
technologies – occasionally to the exclusion of others – based on incorrect or misleading 
information. These factors make it difficult to discern the “best” technology while also limiting 
flexibility.  
 Second, technology-driven policies often force politicians and regulators to identify the 
“best” energy technologies, in essence requiring them to pick “winners”.  There are a multitude 
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of factors that determine “winners” and asking politicians to accurately pick the winners in such 
a complex environment may be unrealistic. For instance, the Department of Energy (DOE) 
invested nearly half of its $2.66 billion in research and development (R&D) funds between 2010 
and 2017 to “assess the readiness for commercial viability of carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technologies.199 Yet by the end of this period only three of nine initial projects remained active, 
while the others were discontinued for lack of technical progress, among other reasons.200 While 
DOE appears to have expected the losses due to the risks inherenet in the demonstration phase of 
R&D,201 this illustrates the difficulties associated with picking “winners”. Furthermore, picking 
the wrong technologies as winners could hinder the development of other technological options 
that may be emerging but not yet known or accepted by regulators.202  This problem is further 
exacerbated by the fact that once a hopeful winner is chosen, the supporting policies may not be 
easily modified due to institutional path dependencies and politico-economic barriers.203  In other 
words, innovation snowballing could also increase the harm in “picking wrong” by “creating the 
possibility that government intervention could start snowballing in an area that turns out to be 
inefficient.”204 
 Finally, technology-driven policies are likely not the most cost-effective option. There is 
a general consensus among economists that command-and-control regulations, such as 
technology-specific mandates, are less efficient than their market-based technology-neutral 
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counterparts.205  These cost differentials can be significant. A 2018 study found that RPSs are 
“approximately twice as costly as the equivalent least-cost portfolio for achieving CO2 
reductions.”206  Clearly, technology-driven policies may be susceptible to a number of 
inescapable challenges regarding their selection and may be a costly choice.  
 
Technology-agnostic Policies  
 
Technology-agnostic policies, or zero carbon policies, are policies that require energy 
generation that either does not emit CO2 or emits only extremely low levels. These policies tend 
to be – but don’t have to be – market-oriented policies such as a carbon tax or a cap and trade 
policy. They also typically include a wide range of technologies such as geothermal, 
hydropower, nuclear, carbon capture and storage from coal, biofuels, and natural gas.  
Technology-agnostic policies are generally goal-oriented with specific and determinable goals of 




 Pursuing technology-agnostic policies allows for (1) a broader coalition of industry 
support; and (2) immediate action from a technological feasibility perspective. Technology-
agnostic policies allow for broader coalitions of support in a notoriously divisive arena.  In 
contrast to technology-driven policies, technology-agnostic policies allow for a wider range of 
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industry support since they can bring together all related technologies and industries that stand to 
benefit from a price on carbon. Take for example California’s SB 100: this bill (now law) was 
able to create a broad climate coalition due primarily to its flexibility and its pledge to be 100 
percent carbon-free energy by 2045, rather than 100 percent renewable energy generation.207  
California’s flexible standard allows for iconic renewables, as well as large hydro, nuclear, and 
natural gas with carbon capture and storage. As a result, it provides an opportunity for a wider 
range of industries to be part of the ultimate solution.208  This flexible standard also allowed SB 
100 to bypass the bitter arguments that often arise between those that believe 100% solar and 
wind is feasible and those that believe higher penetrations of renewables will be costly and 
difficult to achieve.209 Arguments such as these have been the downfall of other attempts to pass 
energy policies at both the state and national level.210  Beyond the broad appeal offered by SB 
100 in California, a study of technology-agnostic CO2 caps in the U.S. found that “the least-cost 
generation mix included a variety of technologies, including nuclear and carbon-capture-
equipped technologies, as well as renewable technologies.”211  This mix only imminently 
possible under SB 100 because it is a technology-agnostic policy.  
 The other primary advantage of technology-agnostic policies is that they would allow 
policy makers to move forward immediately (presuming the passage of the policies) with 
ambitious energy targets without becoming entangled in a feasibility debate. This could be 
critical considering the speed of emissions reductions is a key component of climate change 
mitigation. Technology-agnostic policies allow for greater flexibility and innovation and allow 
                                               
207 David Roberts, California just adopted its boldest energy target yet: 100% clean electricity, VOX, Sept. 10, 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/8/31/17799094/california-100-percent-clean-energy-target-
brown-de-leon. 
208 Id.  
209 Id.  
210 Id.   
211 Young, supra note 206. 
 47 
the market to find and support solutions. Hong, Bradshaw, and Brook212 modeled a range of 
zero-emissions energy scenarios that were designed to meet projected energy demand in 2016 
across the world and found that effective nuclear in association with a country-appropriate mix 
of renewables would yield greater cost and land effectiveness when compared with a 
renewables-only approach.213  This is exactly what a technology-agnostic policy approach would 







 Unfortunately, technology-agnostic policies are also diminished by a number of 
disadvantages, including unacknowledged externalities and their bias towards late-stage 
technology.  First, technology-agnostic policies in the energy sphere typically operate on the 
assumption that carbon emissions are the only externality that should be considered, when in fact 
many of the traditional zero-carbon generation methods have significant additional externalities 
beyond carbon emissions. While additional externalities are not a bar to technology-agnostic 
policies, they would in most cases likely require additional policy solutions to minimize the cost 
of the additional externalities. Ultimately, these policies could likely be justified despite their 
externalities on the basis that cost-effective emissions reductions are the priority. Most zero-
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carbon policies envision the use of some combination of more conventional energy technologies 
such as hydro and nuclear and new technologies such as CCS with either coal or natural gas. 
Nuclear energy has numerous externalities that are not captured in a technology-agnostic policy, 
such as reactor safety, radioactive waste transport, and waste disposal.214  Similarly, hydro power 
is extremely disruptive to natural processes and has been credited with numerous species’ 
extinctions worldwide.215  Beyond its negative effects, it is also unlikely that new hydro 
generation could even be implemented in the U.S. due to societal and environmental 
constraints.216 Furthermore, even new technologies such as CCS have significant unaccounted-
for externalities. Coal mining is widely problematic, and natural gas pipelines are a significant 
negative externality themselves. So, by encouraging a wide array of zero carbon technologies, 
these technology-agnostic policies simultaneously encourage a number of electricity generation 
options that have significant unincorporated negative externalities, but this may be warranted 
given the efficient and cost-effective emissions reductions associated with technology-agnostic 
policies. 
 Beyond their unaccounted-for externalities, technology-agnostic policies also tend to 
favor late-stage technologies which are already commercially viable.217  This makes it difficult 
for new technologies to gain a foothold in the market place and reinforces existing path 
dependencies.  Technology-agnostic policies tend to defer to the market as an arbitrator, but it is 
often not a neutral one because the “playing field is tilted inefficiently towards dirtytech.”218    
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 Ultimately, technology-agnostic policies offer the means to begin to reduce carbon 
emissions now through cost effective measures, which is sufficiently significant considering the 
rate and magnitude of global climate change.  
 
Technology-driven versus Technology-agnostic Conclusions & Implications  
  
 Technology-driven Technology-agnostic  
Advantages • Public support of iconic 
renewables 
• Directly target barriers 
• Correct historical subsidizations 
• Broader coalition of industry support  
• Immediate action from a 
technological feasibility perspective  
Disadvantages • Limit flexibility  
• Require politicians to identify 
the “best” technologies  
• Cost effectiveness  
• Unacknowledged externalities  
• Bias towards late-stage technologies  
Figure 2 – Comparison of Technology-driven and Technology-agnostic Policies  
 
 While the lack of federal action regarding renewable energy policy makes a direct 
comparison between federal- and state-level policies impractical, states acting as laboratories of 
democracy have enacted many variations of policy approaches allowing for a more direct 
comparison of technology-driven versus technology-agnostic policies. Nearly 75% of U.S. states 
have adopted renewable energy policies.219  While most RPS policies are akin to technology-
driven approaches, several states have adopted a clean energy standard (CES), which is a 
“market-based, technology neutral portfolio standard that requires a certain percentage of retail 
electricity sales come from non- or low-emitting sources.”220 A CES is more akin to a 
technology-agnostic policy.   
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North Carolina enacted an RPS called the Renewable Energy and Efficiency Portfolio 
Standard (REPS) in 2007, which required investor-owned utilities to produce 12.5 % of retail 
electricity sales from eligible renewable resources.221 Eligible renewable resources were 
specifically defined within the policy.222 Furthermore, REPS explicitly required a certain level of 
energy production from solar, swine waste, and poultry waste.223 This technologically-
proscriptive approach is clearly a technology-driven policy approach.  
Conversely, California chose to enact a technology-agnostic policy. California enacted a 
cap and trade program in 2013, which caps greenhouse gas emissions.224  Although it is a 
multisector program, it does apply to large electric plants, and represents a true technology-
agnostic approach since the measure of success is emission levels rather than electricity 
generated via eligible technologies. 
Finally, New York adopted a hybrid version of a CES in August 2016 that has elements 
of both technology-driven and technology-agnostic policies. New York’s CES requires at least 
50% of in-state electricity usage to come from renewable energy resources by 2030.225 New 
York’s CES divides renewable energy into several tiers: Tier 1 is designed to support all eligible 
renewable energy generation resources and does not contain any particular carve-outs; Tier 2 is 
designed to support existing renewable energy resources; and Tier 3, the Zero Emissions Credit 
requirement, is designed to support New York’s nuclear facilities, as they are a key component 
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of New York’s goal to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.226  While less technologically 
prescriptive than North Carolina, New York’s CES does still define specific eligible technology, 
rendering it somewhat of a hybrid between technology-driven and technology-agnostic policies. 
These three states have taken varied policy approaches in respect to their electricity generation 
and as a result have fairly different electricity generation profiles.  
 As of 2017, North Carolina generated a majority of its electricity, 66%, from a 
combination of nuclear and natural gas sources.227 The next significant portion, came from coal, 
which represented 27% in 2017 although it had fallen substantially from 62% in 2001.228 
However, North Carolina was also the only Southern state with significant solar generation 
suggesting that it’s technology-driven RPS might have contributed to its geographically unique 
energy generation profile. In 2017, New York produced 37% of its energy from natural gas, 33% 
from nuclear, and 23% from hydroelectric, which is the state’s largest renewable resource.229 
While, New York generated only a very small portion of its electricity from solar and wind, its 
portion of coal generation dropped from approximately 16% in 2001 to negligible amounts in 
2017.230 This profile aligns with the expectations associated with the hybrid approach New York 
has taken to electricity generation as 56% of its energy comes from carbon-free sources but its 
portion of energy generated from specific renewable technologies remains very low. Finally, in 
2017, California, had a more even spread among its electricity generation sources when 
compared to North Carolina and New York. In 2017 California generated 41%  of its electricity 
from natural gas, 20% from hydroelectric, 16% from solar, 8% from nuclear, 6% from wind, 5% 
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from geothermal.231 This profile suggests that greater diversity of energy generation sources may 
be associated with technology-agnostic approaches but these associations are muddied by the 
fact that California also has an aggressive RPS program. Likely, the generation profiles of all of 
these states are affected by a variety of factors including geographic location, historical 
generation, and compounding state policies. Therefore, while it is difficult to conclusively 
determine the “best” policy approach, the ability to compare state generation profiles based on 
varying policy approaches provides an invaluable opportunity to assess the implications of the 
various approaches.  
CONCLUSION  
  
 We have reached a tipping point. We can either embrace change and transform our 
energy generation systems and their guiding policies into beacons of hope for climate change 
mitigation, or we can continue to rely on outdated polices that fracture our country and do little 
to combat climate change. We need new energy policy that is capable of effectively and 
efficiently reducing emissions in our energy generation sector and that recognizes the 
implications and tradeoffs that will occur as a result.  
 Experts warn that we are running out of time to avoid some of the most catastrophic 
impacts of climate change,232 which is why efficient emissions reductions are of paramount 
importance. Although states have historically taken the lead in this arena, increasing technical 
complexity and a dynamic Supreme Court have indicated that it is time for change. A federal 
energy policy would allow for the most efficient emissions reductions because it would 
aggregate the states, permitting for an economy of scale effect to take place. Furthermore, such a 
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uniform approach would ensure progress without having to address concerns over the “race to 
the bottom” or regulatory “leakage”. Some will argue that such policy would represent a 
monopolistic approach that would limit innovations, and while they may be at least partially 
correct, concerns over constraints on innovation are minimal in comparison to global climate 
change. A federal-level energy policy represents our best chance at effectuating meaningful and 
timely change in our electricity sector.   
 Beyond the level of policy implementation, we are also confronted with the type of 
policy we should enact. While there are many advantages and disadvantages of each policy type, 
technology-agnostic policies are more likely to offer more significant emissions reductions more 
quickly. These policies typically incorporate conventional generation methods and as a result are 
immediately actionable and do not require additional baseload generation due to intermittency 
problems. The current trend among states is to incorporate both technology-driven and 
technology-agnostic polices into energy regulation. These hybrid approaches offer a number of 
synergisms that likely render them superior to either policy type on its own. For example, a 
hybrid approach would allow for immediate emissions reductions via conventional generation 
methods, such as nuclear, while leaving open avenues for developing technologies that may not 
be currently market ready but could have a significant role to play in the future.  
 Regardless of specific policy type and level of implementation widespread electrification 
is coming and it will have significant negative consequences for global climate change. It is 
imperative that we develop new energy policy that is prepared to mitigate these negative 
consequences to the greatest extent possible while continuing to remain committed to providing 
energy that is affordable, reliable, and clean.  
 
